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This study advances the limited generalizability of previous studies that have focused on
developed market multinational enterprises and explores the link between institutional
distance and ownership choice of emerging market multinational enterprises (EMNEs).
Such studies in the EMNE context have been rare, and we provide key theoretical expla-
nations for EMNEs’ distinct foreign direct investment motives to act as important contin-
gencies in the link between institutional distance and EMNEs’ ownership choices. Anal-
yses of longitudinal data of Chinese firms’ internationalization from 2001 to 2017 reveal
that the higher the institutional distance, the lower the level of EMNE subsidiary owner-
ship control with market-seeking motives; while the higher the institutional distance, the
higher the level of EMNE subsidiary ownership control with knowledge-seeking motives.
Introduction
Scholars of global strategy and international busi-
ness (IB) have become increasingly interested in
examining the impact of cross-national distance
(Berry, Guillén and Zhou, 2010; Kostova et al.,
2020; Werner, 2002) and foreign subsidiary own-
ership choice (Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992;
Ahammad et al., 2017, 2018; Baik et al., 2013;
Bhaumik, Driffield and Pal, 2010; Delios and
Beamish, 1999;Moalla andMayrhofer, 2020; Pow-
ell and Lim, 2017). The majority of previous stud-
ies on this topic have examined developed market
multinational enterprises (DMNEs) by positing
that such enterprises tend to choose low levels of
foreign subsidiary ownership as distance increases
in order to reducemarket uncertainty and unfamil-
iarity (cf. Brouthers and Hennart, 2007; Hernán-
dez and Nieto, 2015; Morschett, Schramm-Klein
and Swoboda, 2010; Slangen and Hennart, 2007;
Tihanyi, Griffith and Russell, 2005). This perspec-
tive has generated a paramount but neglected re-
search question:Whether and to what extent could
this mechanism be equally applied to the con-
text of emerging market multinational enterprises
(EMNEs), given that such firms are in the early
stage of internationalization and thereby differ-
ent from DMNEs? EMNEs possess distinct types
of foreign direct investment (FDI) motives that
are different from DMNEs’ (Ahammad et al.,
2017; Arslan, Tarba and Larimo, 2015; Brouthers
and Nakos, 2004; Dunning, 1993; Erramilli and
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D’Souza, 1993), such as, for example, EMNEs ex-
pand in foreign markets to overcome institutional
constraints in their home markets (cf. Child and
Marinova, 2014; Gaur and Kumar, 2010; Stoian
and Mohr, 2016; Wang et al., 2012). These specific
FDImotives make EMNEs react to the same insti-
tutional distance by adopting different strategies,
which in turn is reflected in their subsidiary own-
ership choice (cf. Rienda et al., 2019) – a topic that
has unfortunately received inadequate research ef-
fort (e.g. Ahammad et al., 2018; Dikova, Panibra-
tov and Veselova, 2019; Li et al., 2018; Rienda
et al., 2019).
This study is designed to address this important
question by examining the role of EMNEs’ FDI
motives in the effect of institutional distance on
subsidiary ownership choice. As such, we aim to
answer what is critical in EMNEs’ international-
ization activities: How do FDImotives of EMNEs
change the relationship between institutional dis-
tance and degree of foreign subsidiary ownership
as opposed to what has been predicted based on
DMNEs in regard to selecting subsidiary owner-
ship? Our question is motivated not only by lim-
ited studies in the previous literature, but more es-
sentially by its profound importance for advanc-
ing the existing literature in at least two major as-
pects. On the one hand, given that prior studies
on institutional distance and foreign market ex-
pansions have been predominately concentrated
on DMNEs (cf. Ahammad et al., 2017; Dikova,
Arslan and Larimo, 2017; Hernández and Nieto,
2015; Moalla and Mayrhofer, 2020), the reality is
that EMNEs are at a different stage of interna-
tionalization and characterized bymore aggressive
and springboard behaviours. In addition, the fact
that EMNEs receive strong institutional support
from their homemarkets (Bonaglia, Goldstein and
Mathews, 2007; Luo and Tung, 2007, 2018) im-
plies that previous studies on DMNEs cannot eas-
ily be generalizable in the case of EMNEs. EMNEs
are also very different compared to DMNEs in
the way that, for example, for EMNEs, institu-
tional distance not only generates various costs
that could be linked to institutional differences
– such as costs related to unfamiliarity hazards
and relational hazards (Gaur and Lu, 2007), but
also creates the opportunity of institutional ar-
bitrage (Wu and Park, 2019). This choice of ap-
propriate ownership status helps EMNEs to either
mitigate such costs or take advantage of poten-
tial institutional arbitrage, or both. On the other
hand, although previous studies have considered
the impact of MNEs’ FDI motives on subsidiary
ownership control (Ahammad et al., 2017; Dikova
and van Witteloostuijn, 2007; Kim and Hwang,
1992; Wang and Larimo, 2020), these studies have
not considered how different FDI motives interact
with institutional distance to influence subsidiary
ownership choice, as well as their direct effect on
subsidiary ownership control (Dunning and Lun-
dan, 2008; Li et al., 2018; Powell and Lim, 2017).
The empirical findings of previous studies have
been mixed at best (Ahammad et al., 2018; Moalla
and Mayrhofer, 2020; Zhao, Luo and Suh, 2004)
and have also been complicated by different stages
of EMNE internationalization, which naturally
have distinct FDI motives from those of DMNEs.
Such double motivations of theoretical intention
make investigating the role of FDI in the link be-
tween institutional distance and EMNEs’ owner-
ship choice particularly important and timely.
In investigating the relationship, we take as our
starting point FDI motives and ownership control
between institutional distance for two reasons.
First, although extant studies have suggested vari-
ous dimensions of distance, the most attention has
been paid to examining cultural distance and firm-
level phenomena, including ownership choice (e.g.
Ambos and Håkanson, 2014; Berry, Guillén and
Zhou, 2010; Beugelsdijk et al., 2018; Hutzschen-
reuter, Kleindienst and Lange, 2015; Powell
and Lim, 2017; Shenkar, 2001; Shenkar et al.,
2020). Institutional distance is more particular
for EMNEs, as extant research has suggested that
escaping from poor home institutional environ-
ments is not the only motive behind Chinese firms’
outward investment (Liu, Buck and Shu, 2005).
This suggests other motives – such as knowledge
and market seeking – as Child and Rodrigues
(2005, p. 401) indicate: ‘institutional constraints
such as legal uncertainties, obstruction of do-
mestic acquisitions, and regional protectionism
through license restrictions do remain a problem,
but it seems that successful firms have found ways
to accommodate or circumvent them’. Second,
in EMNEs’ overseas expansion, institutional dis-
tance not only contributes more to uncertainty
and cost, but also provides an opportunity not
applicable to other types of distance; that is,
institutional arbitrage as EMNEs are rapidly
expanding into foreign markets due to a variety of
motives such as escaping from poor institutional
environments, as well as acquiring strategic assets
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(Child and Marinova, 2014; Child and Rodrigues,
2005; Stoian and Mohr, 2016; Wang et al., 2012).
Hence, institutional distance has a profound
impact on EMNEs’ internationalization and own-
ership status (cf. Delios and Henisz, 2000; Powell
and Lim, 2017).
In this study, we focus on two types of FDI mo-
tives – market-seeking motives versus knowledge-
seeking motives – that are highly relevant for
EMNEs as they are expanding into both devel-
oped and developing markets, which is clearly il-
lustrated by the case of Chinese investment in
Africa and other developed economies. On the
one hand, market-seeking FDI motives arise when
EMNEs seek to either sustain or protect existing
markets in which they exploit advantages and ca-
pabilities. On the other hand, knowledge-seeking
FDI motives arise when EMNEs seek to access
various types of knowledge to explore and de-
velop a new set of capabilities (Chung and Al-
cacer, 2002; He, Khan and Shenkar, 2018). More-
over, it is exactly these two types of FDI motives
that make EMNEs distinct from DMNEs. For ex-
ample, EMNEs’ early rather than mature stage of
internationalization gives them some advantages
(e.g. high efficiency and low cost, supplied by hav-
ing a large cheap labour force) that encourage ex-
panding sales to foreign markets where they can
compete with local rivals. However, most EMNEs
still lack cutting-edge knowledge and are moti-
vated to expand to developed markets to acquire
and develop highly advanced technologies (cf.
Bonaglia, Goldstein and Mathews, 2007; Cuervo-
Cazurra and Ramamurti, 2014; Kedia, Gaffney
and Clampit, 2012). We thus investigate how these
two types of FDI motives affect the link between
institutional distance and EMNEs’ ownership sta-
tus, which is one of the most important deci-
sions in MNEs’ international expansion (Hennart
and Slangen, 2015; Madhok and Keyhani, 2012;
Rienda et al., 2019; Zhao, Luo and Suh, 2004).
Equally importantly, they provide empirical pu-
rity due to their close association with institutional
distance and FDI motives, because, for example,
EMNEs adopting high levels of subsidiary equity
ownership gain more control over a foreign sub-
sidiary than those with low levels of subsidiary
equity ownership, which is more convenient for
knowledge-seeking FDI, but less so for market-
seeking FDI across borders.
We conduct our empirical analyses of these re-
lationships on longitudinal data of ChineseMNEs
for two reasons. First, Chinese MNEs have been
described as having distinct FDI motives, and in
particular, the above-mentioned two motives have
been mentioned frequently in extant studies (He,
Khan and Shenkar, 2018; Wu et al., 2016). Sec-
ond, Chinese MNEs have been very proactive in
expanding into various foreign markets that are ei-
ther institutionally distant, such as investment in
developed markets (e.g. He, Khan and Shenkar,
2018), or proximate to the home country (Piper-
opoulos, Wu and Wang, 2018). The findings of
the current study provide unique insights that shed
light on the critical issue of whether existing under-
standing of the underlying effect of institutional
distance on subsidiary ownership control based on
DMNEs’ patterns applies to the special case of
EMNEs (Ahammad et al., 2017; Dikova, Arslan
and Larimo, 2017; Moalla and Mayrhofer, 2020).
Overall, we contribute to extant studies (e.g. Berry,
Guillén and Zhou, 2010; Moalla and Mayrhofer,
2020; Shaver, 2013) by linking institutional dis-
tance with subsidiary control in which knowledge-
seeking motives of EMNEs are not amenable to
higher institutional distance.
Subsidiary ownership and cross-national
distance
Institutional distance and MNE subsidiary
ownership
How does institutional distance affect EMNEs’
ownership status of subsidiaries? To answer this
question, we draw on insights from two relevant
research streams. Although both of these streams
have been developed from their own theoretical
logics in the DMNE context, they provide rather
opposite predictions. We incorporate the insights
from each to pinpoint a twin effect of the same
coin (i.e. institutional distance for EMNEs).
Institutional and global strategy scholars have
argued that greater distance is associated with an
increased difficulty in coordinating and cooperat-
ing with local partners. This difficulty could influ-
ence the choice of high-level ownership and espe-
cially full ownership of the subsidiary (cf. Pow-
ell and Lim, 2017). For instance, in examining
the ownership structure of Japanese MNEs in 36
countries from 1969 to 1991, Padmanabhan and
Cho (1996) found that MNEs prefer total control
to be partial or shared (as with a joint venture)
when the cultural distance is significant. Similarly,
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in an 11-year sample of 1,389 acquisitions in India
andChina and acquirers from33 nations, Contrac-
tor et al. (2014) found that the likelihood of minor-
ity acquisition (rather than majority or full own-
ership) was higher when the acquisition involved
low institutional distance. Similarly, the study by
Rienda et al., 2019 suggested that Indian firms
prefer acquisitions when the distance between the
home and the host country is low. Followers of the
Uppsala School have argued that firms should re-
duce their ownership levels to minimize risk when
the distance between host and home countries in-
creases, especially in the early stages of interna-
tionalization (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; Johan-
son and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975).
Other scholars have tried to reconcile these con-
flicting results by investigating various modera-
tors of the relationship between cross-national dis-
tance and foreign subsidiary ownership. For exam-
ple, in a meta-analysis, Zhao, Luo and Suh (2004)
showed that the relationship between cultural dis-
tance and entry-mode choice is significantly mod-
erated by location, country of origin and indus-
try type. Similarly, Tihanyi, Griffith and Russell
(2005) found that the home country moderates the
cultural distance–entry mode relationship. These
findings are least relevant in the case of EMNEs,
as they do not take into account unique chal-
lenges and opportunities for EMNEs facing large
institutional distance and limited internationaliza-
tion experience. Specifically, we argue that a high
level of institutional distance not only represents
high uncertainty and costs for business activities,
but also offers an opportunity for institutional
arbitrage. On the one hand, a large institutional
distance, which is defined as the contextual dif-
ference between countries (Kostova et al., 2020,
p. 467), and managing that distance has been indi-
cated to be vital in performing cross-border busi-
ness activities (Zaheer, Schomaker and Nachum,
2012, p. 19). Such differences inescapably involve
high costs such as institutional misalignment, co-
ordination costs and ideological conflicts. A large
institutional distance is especially challenging for
EMNEs that are expanding from less-developed
markets with weak institutional environments to
developed markets with efficient institutional envi-
ronments and less government intervention. Such
institutional differences pose greater challenges for
EMNEs due to their latecomer status and unfamil-
iarity with the institutional environments of devel-
oped markets.
On the other hand, compared to DMNEs, many
EMNEs are still in the early stages of internation-
alization and aggressively expanding into foreign
markets to not only exploit their home-based
experience, but also take advantage of strong and
stable institutional environments in host markets
(cf. Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2018; James, Sawant
and Bendickson, 2020; Meyer and Thaijongrak,
2013). A large institutional distance provides these
EMNEs with an opportunity for institutional
arbitrage in two ways. First, they utilize the insti-
tutional advantages of a host market (e.g. effective
protection of properties and intellectual prop-
erties) to develop and grow their business assets
and technologies. Second, these companies also
engage in institutional arbitrage by taking advan-
tage of institutional differences between the host
and home markets or between the host and host
markets that are unavailable and unimaginable
for their counterparts that do not have such an
exposure through which they can develop certain
core competences embedded in this opportunity.
We thus resolve the intellectual tension between
two literature streams by synthesizing their in-
sights with the peculiarity of EMNEs in terms of
relatively early stages of internationalization and
proactive overseas expansion. This is not only to
exploit their home-based experience, but also to
capitalize on the institutional merits/differences
of host markets (cf. Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2018;
James, Sawant and Bendickson, 2020; Meyer and
Thaijongrak, 2013). In addition, a high level of
uncertainty and costs associated with institutional
distance offers the opportunity for institutional
arbitrage for EMNEs. Such a double effect of
institutional distance for EMNEs, though subtle,
has profound theoretical implications not only for
EMNE ownership choices in foreign markets, but
also for the role of FDI motives in shaping the
relationship between institutional distance and
ownership status. We next develop the theoretical
arguments and explain how different FDI motives
relate to institutional differences.
Institutional distance and FDI motives of EMNEs
EMNEs with marketing and production exper-
tise for specialized niches, standardized produc-
tion processes, managerial flexibility in an uncer-
tain and institutionally immature environment and
unique networking capabilities (e.g. He, Khan and
Shenkar, 2018; Madhok and Keyhani, 2012) are
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motivated to exploit these accumulated advantages
in more new markets by expanding and investing
abroad where they can earn more returns. This
exploitation is well exemplified by many EMNEs
(like Alibaba and Xiaomi) that have expanded
to many less-developed markets such as Pakistan
and India, as well as many African countries. In
contrast, other EMNEs are motived to expand
into foreign markets to acquire new knowledge
(Dunning and Lundan, 2008; Kedia, Gaffney and
Clampit, 2012), which is clearly exemplified by
many high-tech EMNEs (e.g. TikTok andHuawei)
that have expanded into developedmarkets such as
theUSAand theUK to acquire and develop highly
sophisticated technologies (e.g. high-speed compu-
tation with excellent accuracy). Regardless of the
type of FDI motive, EMNEs, due to their rela-
tively early stage of internationalization, usually
lack the experience of operating abroad and thus
expand to seek novel knowledge and capabilities
in foreign markets that are otherwise unavailable
in their home markets (Agarwal and Ramaswami,
1992; Luo and Tung, 2007). Scholars have fo-
cused on understanding such firms’ outward in-
vestment motives and suggested that these firms
have various motives for outward internationaliza-
tion, ranging from knowledge-seeking to escaping
from their poor home environment (cf. Child and
Rodrigues, 2005; Gaur and Kumar, 2010; Kolstad
and Wiig, 2012; Stoian and Mohr, 2016). Firms
are also embedded in multiple institutional con-
texts (Meyer,Mudambi andNarula, 2011) that im-
ply distinct FDImotives entailing distinct strategic
priorities and concerns depending on the underly-
ing motives (Lu, Liu and Wang, 2011), which un-
avoidably interact with the institutional distance.
That is, EMNEs’ distinct FDI motives will have
a strong imprint on their choice of foreign sub-
sidiary ownership level as a response to institu-
tional distance when entering foreign markets to
exploit home-accumulated advantages, while man-
aging opportunism and breaches of contract that
can happen easily in joint venture (JV)-type ar-
rangements (Hennart, 1991).
How do distinct FDI motives interact with in-
stitutional distance? Although scholars have rec-
ognized the important role of motivation in FDI
decisions, including its impact on location choices
(Zhou and Guillen, 2016), few have considered
the possibility that different types of such motives
may influence the effect of distance on the foreign
subsidiary ownership level in an opposite way (cf.
Moalla andMayrhofer, 2020; Rienda et al., 2019).
There have been no studies on this question in re-
lation to EMNEs. To fill this theoretical gap in the
literature, we subsequently develop theoretical ar-
guments for the moderating role of FDI motives
on the linkage between institutional distance and
EMNE ownership status.
Theoretical model and hypothesis
development
The moderating role of the market-seeking motive
on the distance effect of subsidiary ownership
control decisions
As institutional distance increases, EMNEs in-
cur additional costs, such as unfamiliarity with
host-country institutional environments, as well as
relational costs of establishing local connections
and networks (cf. Gaur andLu, 2007).MNEsmust
carefully choose ownership status because differ-
ent types involve various costs that could be linked
to institutional differences, such as costs related
to unfamiliarity hazards and relational hazards
(Gaur and Lu, 2007). While a higher institu-
tional distance creates more risk, market-seeking
FDI helps reduce such costs due to its relatively
low-risk nature. Market-seeking FDI should be
considered low risk because many EMNEs are
expanding to new markets to exploit their accu-
mulated advantages (e.g. standardized production
with high efficiency) in a broader customer base
and they compete with local rivals in host markets
(Dikova, Panibratov and Veselova, 2019) by solely
relying on their home-accumulated advantages. In
this way, EMNEs have less worries about losing
such home-based advantages to local rivals un-
able to imitate these advantages, unless they can
access a large cheap labour force embedded in the
former’s home market. Low-risk FDI greatly mit-
igates the uncertainty and costs associated with a
large institutional distance, leading to low control
of ownership. In addition, the market-seeking
motive requires less experiential knowledge about
the host markets, given that EMNEs must offer
standard and low-cost products that require low
control in greater institutional-distance markets.
The demand conditions of market-seeking EMNE
products also vary in greater institutional-distance
markets, and thus these firms may opt for low-risk
and low-resource commitment ownership con-
trol. These arguments are consistent with extant
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literature that indicates greater risk exposure
and uncertain demand conditions are conducive
for firms to pursue low-control strategies (cf.
Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; Kim and Hwang,
1992).
Nevertheless, how does the market-seeking mo-
tive interact with institutional arbitrage provided
by greater institutional distance? Even though
market-seeking FDI is low risk, it does not mean
zero risk, especially for those EMNEs expanding
to less-developedmarkets where weak institutional
infrastructure and high institutional risk exist, as
well as stricter restrictions with respect to transfer-
ring the profits out of their countries. In such cases,
EMNEs can seek special treatment by the host
government and strong protection of their busi-
nesses and properties by counting on institutional
ties between the host and home countries – cur-
rently exemplified by Chinese MNEs’ investments
in Pakistan that are well protected by local gov-
ernments thanks to a strong long-term relationship
between the two countries. Such institutional arbi-
trage greatly mitigates high costs and uncertainty
associated with institutional distance.
While some scholars may argue that great insti-
tutional distance generates a high risk of exchange
rate for MNEs that transfer their profits back to
their home markets (cf. Lin, Chen and Rau, 2010),
this argument neglects that these EMNEs, accord-
ing to local regulations and policies, must rein-
vest most of their profits in host markets, thus
making these EMNEs with market-seeking mo-
tives less likely to incur the risk of exchange-rate
exposure associated with greater institutional dis-
tance. Thus, EMNEs with market-seeking motives
will seek a lower level of ownership control when
the institutional distance is greater. This leads us
to suggest that:
H1: The higher the institutional distance, the lower
the level of subsidiary ownership control by
EMNEs with a market-seeking motive.
Moderating role of the knowledge-seeking motive
on the distance effect on subsidiary ownership
control decisions
A different situation arises when EMNEs with
a knowledge-seeking FDI motive want to invest
in a foreign market with large institutional dis-
tance. Many EMNEs invest in foreign countries
with large institutional distances to acquire new
knowledge and technologies that are otherwise un-
available at home (He, Khan and Shenkar, 2018;
Kedia, Gaffney and Clampit, 2012; Kotabe and
Kothari, 2016; Luo and Tung, 2007, 2018). In
some cases, EMNEs that need advanced technolo-
gies and knowledge in their home operations will
bear a high risk in terms of potential knowledge
distortion and/or leakage along the way, compared
to EMNEs transferring from a foreignmarket with
a low institutional distance, as it is easier when
there is greater familiarity with the source. It is dif-
ficult for an EMNE to transfer acquired knowl-
edge without effective control over the process
(Makino and Delios, 1996; Steensma et al., 2000).
A high level of ownership over a foreign subsidiary
helps an EMNE improve the efficiency of knowl-
edge transfer within their global networks and
avoid knowledge distortion, especially in transfer-
ring highly complex and tacit knowledge from a
host country with a large institutional distance
(Ambos and Ambos, 2009; Bresman, Birkinshaw
and Nobel, 2010; Kostova, 1999).
EMNEs primarily acquire strategic assets
through acquisitions of firms originating in
greater institutionally distant markets (Ahammad
et al., 2018; Dikova, Panibratov and Veselova,
2019; He, Khan and Shenkar, 2018; Li et al., 2018)
in order to develop capabilities. High-ownership
control gives access to knowledge assets that might
not be readily available through low-commitment
entry-mode options. As such, EMNEs prefer
high commitment by acquiring firms from high-
institutional distance markets (e.g. He, Khan
and Shenkar, 2018; Nicholson and Salaber, 2013;
Rienda et al., 2019). Similarly, Gaur and Lu (2007)
indicated that an important means of mitigating
higher transaction costs in markets that represent
higher institutional distance utilizes a high level
of ownership control that offers the firm greater
control over foreign operations. This line of rea-
soning suggests that greater institutional distance
leads to uncertainty and unfamiliarity for firms
expanding into foreign markets, and therefore
incurs higher transaction costs and requires entry
modes to consign resource commitments (Kim
and Gray, 2008; Tihanyi, Griffith and Russell,
2005; Zaheer, Schomaker and Nachum, 2012),
to benefit from local know-how and gain im-
portant foreign market knowledge. For example,
Xie and Li’s (2017) study of Chinese internation-
alizing firms between 1987 and 2008 suggested
that such firms are less likely to acquire a high
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equity stake in markets with a lower institutional
distance in terms of economic development that
pose significant risk to firms’ operations. EMNEs
expanding to other developing and emerging
economies encounter fragile institutions com-
pared to developed markets and, as such, commit
fewer resources. Therefore, EMNEs expanding to
developed markets to acquire new technologies
can utilize institutional advantages of the host
market (e.g. effective protection of intellectual
property) to develop their core technologies and
competence, enabling them to effectively compete
with their developed-market counterparts.
With knowledge-seeking motives, EMNEs ex-
panding into foreign markets with a large in-
stitutional distance prefer high levels of equity
ownership that allow them to effectively manage
knowledge acquisition and transfer across borders
(Dikova, Panibratov and Veselova, 2019; Estrin,
Baghdasaryan and Meyer, 2009; He, Khan and
Shenkar, 2018; Kim et al., 2020; Kostova, 1999;
Li et al., 2018; Zaheer, Schomaker and Nachum,
2012). Such arguments are in line with extant lit-
erature that has suggested a high-control mode is
preferred when a firm wants to quickly learn from
foreign sources of knowledge (cf. Zahra, Ireland
and Hitt, 2000). Based on the preceding discus-
sion, we hypothesize:
H2: The higher the institutional distance, the
higher the level of subsidiary ownership control
by EMNEs with knowledge-seeking motives.
Data and analysis
Data
The study sample includes Chinese manufacturing
MNEs listed on local stock markets from 2001 to
2017. Chinese MNEs grew rapidly in local and in-
ternational markets during this period. We iden-
tified the EMNEs based on information available
from the Shenzhen and Shanghai exchanges and
the China Securities Regulatory Commission. Be-
cause our analysis is at the foreign subsidiary level,
we relied on annual reports to collect information
on the EMNEs’ foreign subsidiaries, the degree
of subsidiary ownership, and the location of for-
eign subsidiaries. Following guidelines from previ-
ous studies (e.g. Beamish and Inkpen, 1998), we
dropped agencies or sales operations without sub-
stantive local operations. The sample is also lim-
ited to subsidiaries less than 10 years old in or-
der to remain consistent with the early stage of
internationalization, given that most firms origi-
nating from emerging markets are latecomers on
the global stage (e.g. Kedia, Gaffney and Clampit,
2012).
To identify FDI motives for these foreign sub-
sidiaries, we analysed the content of the selected
MNEs’ annual reports. To maintain consistency
with our theoretical interest, we limited our anal-
yses to two specific FDI motives – identified by
prior studies to be highly relevant for EMNEs and
having provoked theoretical debate (Piperopoulos,
Wu andWang, 2018;Wu and Park, 2019). We sub-
tracted the sample firms’ performance and R&D
investments from their FDI activities as listed in
the Company Financial Dataset provided by the
China StockMarket and Accounting Research Co
Ltd. We extracted distance data from the database
developed by Berry, Guillén and Zhou (2010). Af-
ter removing the cases with substantial missing in-
formation for the key variables, the final sample
contained 9,305 subsidiary–year observations of
570 Chinese MNEs from 2001 to 2017.
Measures
Dependent variables. Consistent with our hy-
potheses, we measured the dependent variable as
the ownership-holding ratio in foreign subsidiaries
(Brouthers, Brouthers and Werner, 2003; Shaver,
1998) by reviewing each EMNE’s annual report to
collect the annual status of its equity ownership for
each foreign subsidiary throughout the study pe-
riod. To verify the data reliability, we compared the
averaged value of equity control of Chinese sub-
sidiary equity ownership with prior studies (e.g.
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012) and found consistent re-
sults in terms of EMNEs tending to exercise a high
value of equity control over their overseas sub-
sidiaries. These results could be due to a lack of
advanced experience and skills that not only make
managers incapable of protecting their resources
and knowledge, but may also make them feel in-
ferior when relying on external market institutions
for protection.
Independent and moderating variables. Among
themultiple sources of measuring institutional dis-
tance, we identified measures developed by Berry,
Guillén and Zhou (2010), as they calculated cross-
national distance using the Mahalanobis method
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rather than the traditional Euclidean method.
Although both measures satisfy five desirable as-
pects – symmetry, non-negativity, identification,
definiteness and triangulation inequality – the
Euclidean-based measure suffers from three short-
ages compared with the Mahalanobis-based mea-
sure. The first problem is that the Euclidean-based
method ignores the correlation between the vari-
able indicators used for computing, resulting in as-
signing more importance or weight to the charac-
teristic measured by the correlated variables. The
second problem is that this method neglects the
variance of the variables. The third problem is that
it is sensitive to the scale of measurement (Berry,
Guillén and Zhou, 2010). TheMahalanobis-based
measure does not have these problems. As such,
we adopted theMahalanobis-basedmeasure of in-
stitutional distance. Specifically, the Mahalanobis
distance between two countries is calculated as
√
(Ccountry1 − Ccountry2)TW−1(Ccountry1 − Ccountry2)
where W−1 is the inverse of the pooled covariance
matrix and C is a column vector representing the
components of the distance dimension.
We measured institutional distance by the
Mahalanobis-based measure of cross-national
governance distance, referring to the differences
in political stability, democracy and policy-
making uncertainty (Henisz, 2000; Henisz and
Williamson, 1999; Whitley, 1992). This variable
has two aspects of administrative distance and
political distance, and consists of five indicators:
political stability, democracy scores, size of the
state sector relative to that of the total economy,
World Trade Organization (WTO) membership
and regional trade agreement (Berry, Guillén and
Zhou, 2010).1 The internal consistency of this
variable is relatively high (Cronbach’s alpha =
0.94), bolstering our confidence in this measure of
governance distance.
We relied on information from the sample firms’
annual reports to determine their primary inter-
nationalization motives. For example, Hangzhou
Hundsun Electronics Co. Ltd explicitly states the
primary goals of its subsidiary in Japan as soft-
ware research and development and new product
design, among others. In contrast, Shenzhen Jiawei
Photovoltaic Lighting reports the primary motive
1Details of distance measures can be found in tables 2 and
3 of Berry, Guillén and Zhou (2010, pp. 1465–1466).
of its subsidiary in Canada as promoting sales and
increasing market share. Specifically, we first sub-
tracted detailed information on all the sample of
Chinese MNE subsidiaries. We then identified the
main purpose of each subsidiary based on that
detailed description. If a subsidiary indicates ac-
cessing advanced technologies in a host market
is the key FDI motive, we coded it a knowledge-
seeking motive; if a subsidiary indicates that in-
creasing sales in new foreign markets is the key
FDI motive, we coded it a market-seeking motive.
Accordingly, we categorized ChineseMNEs’FDIs
into two types: (a) to increase sales in new markets
(market-seeking); and (b) to seek knowledge or
conduct R&D (knowledge-seeking). We thus cre-
ated two dummy variables: market-seeking motive
and knowledge-seeking motive. When a company
stated multiple FDI motives, we used the most fre-
quently mentioned motive as the primary one.2
Control variables. We also included several con-
trol variables that could affect EMNEs’ ownership
decisions. First, regarding the parent-firm effect,
we controlled for the parent-firm size (measured
by the logarithm of its annual sales in Chinese
yuan), age (years in operation), performance (re-
turn on assets) and R&D intensity (R&D expendi-
tures divided by total sales) (Wu and Park, 2019).
Second, we included the level of state ownership
(shares owned by the Chinese government) and the
initial ownership level, which we measured by the
MNCs’ level of ownership at the time of initial en-
try into the foreign market (set to 1 if the EMNE
had full ownership) (Chen andHennart, 2002).We
extracted ownership data from the equity change
database of publicly listed companies in China
and gathered other information from the firms’ an-
nual reports (Piperopoulos, Wu and Wang, 2018).
Third, we controlled for subsidiary age – the years
elapsed since the firm’s establishment. Moreover,
we controlled for the subsidiary size, which is op-
erationalized by the real capital of the subsidiary
invested in a foreign market. This variable takes
the logarithm transformation. In addition, we gen-
erated variable, efficiency-seeking motives if an
2When coding FDI motivations, we paid particular atten-
tion to the possibility of Chinese MNEs having multiple
motivations and carefully checked those cases. More than
94% of Chinese MNEs have an unambiguous FDI moti-
vation. For the remaining Chinese MNEs with multiple
motivations, marginal motivations are obviously less crit-
ical compared to the dominant FDI motivation.
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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EMNE indicates that a specific FDI is undertaken
to improve efficiency, such as manufacturing with
no professed sales function (efficiency-seeking).
We also controlled for other types of cross-
national distance – including economic, demo-
graphic, cultural and geographic distance – that
were all extracted from Berry, Guillén and Zhou
(2010).3 National economic distance refers to dif-
ferences in economic development and macroeco-
nomic characteristics (Caves, 1996;Whitley, 1992).
We measured economic distance based on a pair-
wise economic distance that consists of four com-
ponents: GDP per capita (US$2,000), GDP de-
flator (% GDP), exports of goods and services
(% GDP) and imports of goods and services (%
GDP). We extracted national economic distance
and other distances from Berry, Guillén and Zhou
(2010).
In addition, prior researchers have suggested
that a possible concern is related to the distance
directions, as cross-national distance can be posi-
tive or negative depending on the host country (De
Beule, Elia and Piscitello, 2014; Shenkar, 2012; Za-
heer, Schomaker and Nachum, 2012). To address
this concern, we created a control variable,OECD,
which was 1 if the foreign market belongs to the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment (OECD) and 0 otherwise.Moreover, we
controlled for the financial crisis, which was coded
1 if the year is 2008 and 0 otherwise (Fainshmidt,
Nair andMallon, 2017). Finally, we included mul-
tiple dummy variables for industry (measured us-
ing China’s four-digit SIC coding system) and year
of establishment (see Appendix A for variable de-
scription).
Econometric modelling. We used a two-stage
Heckman selection model (Heckman, 1979) to
correct for potential self-selection bias. The first-
stage analysis estimates the probability of an
MNE’s entry into a foreign market, and the
second-stage analysis estimates the levels of sub-
sidiary ownership incorporating the parameters
estimated from the first-stage analyses.
Firms purposely choose their entry strategies
based on the nature of firm-specific character, ca-
pabilities and industry conditions (Shaver, 1998).
As such, in the first-stage analysis that estimates
the probability of an MNE’s entry into a foreign
3Details of distance measures can be found in Table 2 and
Table 3 in Berry, Guillen, and Zhou (2010, p. 1465–1466).
market using the full sample (including firms that
have and have not expanded overseas), we included
the variables that potentially influence a Chinese
MNE’s entry into a foreign market, such as the
level of state ownership (because a high level of
state ownership is more likely to be pushed by the
‘Go Global’ policy), past performance proxied by
return on assets (ROA) (because a Chinese MNE
with a good performance would like more slack
resources that enable it to expand overseas), the
level of foreign ownership (because a high level of
foreign ownership facilitates access to foreign mar-
kets), distance variable (because a high distance in-
creases the difficulty of market entry), FDI mo-
tives (because a firm with motives for either for-
eignmarkets or knowledge ismore likely to expand
overseas), industry dummy (because different in-
dustries have different propensities for expanding
overseas) and year dummy (taking account of dif-
ferent temporal effects).4 After the first-stage re-
gression, we generated an inverse Mills ratio λ,
which was then inserted into the second-stage re-
gression analyses. In the second stage, we estimated
the level of subsidiary ownership control using the
sample of EMNE subsidiary ownership (includ-
ing Chinese firms that used high-ownership con-
trol mode and low-ownership control mode). The
equation of the second stage is specified as
Sj = β0 + β1Xj + β2MS + β3KS + β4ID
+ β5MS × ID + β7KS × ID + β9λi + εj
where Sj is firm j’s subsidiary ownership, Xj is
a vector of control variables (including sub-
sidiary information, local institutional variables
and parent-firm performance) and λi is an esti-
mate from the first-stage model. The coefficient es-
timates of β9 indicate a firm’s probability of for-
eign expansion. Finally, εj is a random error term.
We lagged the independent variables 1 year behind
the dependent variable.
Results
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics and corre-
lation matrix for variables used in the analyses. As
expected, firm age, firm size, past performance and
R&D intensity are all significantly correlated with
4The results of the first-stage analyses are available upon
request.
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Table 2. Main results of hypothesis testing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Firm age 10.512 9.953 9.613 9.601 9.626
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Firm size −9.920 −9.649 −9.403 −9.439 −9.406
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
State ownership percent 0.463 0.279 0.355 0.363 0.377
(0.398) (0.606) (0.506) (0.496) (0.480)
Past performance −0.554 0.218 −0.126 −0.084 −0.097
(0.499) (0.788) (0.875) (0.916) (0.903)
R&D intensity 0.508 0.923 0.769 1.254 1.142
(0.785) (0.614) (0.669) (0.486) (0.526)
Subsidiary age −7.105 −6.714 −6.459 −6.479 −6.510
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Subsidiary size 0.176 0.326 0.335 0.348 0.338
(0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Demographic distance 2.164 3.527 3.947 4.692 4.554
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Culture distance −0.285 0.162 0.323 0.283 0.389
(0.635) (0.786) (0.586) (0.632) (0.512)
Geographic distance 0.028 −1.283 −1.669 −2.265 −2.209
(0.963) (0.033) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000)
Economic distance 0.887 0.389 0.042 −0.082 −0.115
(0.004) (0.197) (0.889) (0.784) (0.702)
OECD 0.465 0.878 0.453 0.657 0.593
(0.435) (0.139) (0.440) (0.264) (0.313)
Financial crisis −0.000 −0.000 −1.661 −1.516 −1.597
(0.100) (0.100) (0.053) (0.077) (0.063)
Correction for self-selection (λ) −34.325 13.724 13.289 10.124 10.662
(0.000) (0.111) (0.119) (0.236) (0.212)
Institutional distance −0.122 −0.247 −0.086 −0.553 −0.452
(0.039) (0.000) (0.277) (0.000) (0.000)
MS 3.207 2.455 2.314 2.210
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
KS 5.601 5.193 4.662 4.880
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
MS * Institutional distance −0.198 −0.224
(0.063) (0.035)
KS * Institutional distance 0.759 0.781
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant 98.086 91.419 91.796 92.205 92.178
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Industry dummy Included Included Included Included Included
Year dummy Included Included Included Included Included
Log-likelihood −4.10e04 −4.05e04 −4.00e04 −4.00e04 −4.00e04
AIC 82,085.721 81,040.560 80,066.318 80,052.413 80,049.961
Prob. > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N = 9,305. P-values are in parentheses.
subsidiary ownership. As significant correlations
existed among some variables, we further investi-
gated the potential multicollinearity by computing
variance inflation factors. The highest value was
for firm age (4.21), and the average variance
inflation factor was 1.01, which are well below
the accepted threshold of 5 and suggest that the
dataset does not have a serious multicollinearity
problem.
Table 2 presents the independent effects of both
market- and knowledge-seeking, as well as the in-
teraction with institutional distance on Chinese
MNC subsidiary ownership. After the baseline
model of firm-level control variables and insti-
tutional distance (Model 1), Model 2 presents
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Figure 1. Interaction of market-seeking and institutional distance
the main effects of market-seeking FDI and
knowledge-seeking FDI, and Models 3–5 present
their interactions with institutional distance.
Of the control variables, firm size showed a sig-
nificant and negative relationship with subsidiary
ownership. This suggests that large ChineseMNEs
tend tomaintain relatively high levels of ownership
over their foreign subsidiaries, while older MNEs
may use a light approach in their foreign expansion
– probably due to their accumulated international
experience. In addition, when encountering a large
economic distance, Chinese MNEs tend to opt for
relatively high levels of ownership. Given that the
results are consistent across the models, we used
the full model (Model 5) to interpret the results of
our hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1 predicted that the higher the insti-
tutional distance, the lower the level of subsidiary
ownership control by EMNEs with a market-
seeking motive. The coefficient for the interaction
term,MS * institutional distance, was negative and
significant (b = −0.224, p = 0.035), with con-
fidence interval [−0.432, −0.015]. To better un-
derstand the interaction effect between MS and
institutional distance on levels of equity owner-
ship, we plotted this relationship. As shown in
Figure 1, the x-axis represents low and high lev-
els of institutional distance; the y-axis represents
levels of equity ownership by Chinese MNEs; the
solid line represents the Chinese MNEs with a
market-seeking motive; and the dotted line repre-
sents the ChineseMNEs without a market-seeking
motive. In general, both lines have a negative slope,
but the solid line is steeper than the dotted linewith
an increase in institutional distance, indicating that
Chinese MNEs with market-seeking motives tend
to adopt low levels of equity ownership with an
increase in institutional distance. Thus, H1 is sup-
ported.
Hypothesis 2 predicted that the higher the insti-
tutional distance, the higher the level of subsidiary
ownership control by EMNEs with a knowledge-
seeking motive. The coefficient for the interac-
tion term, KS * institutional distance, was posi-
tive and significant (b = 0.781, p = 0.000), with
confidence interval [0.423, 1.140]. To better under-
stand the interaction effect between KS and in-
stitutional distance on levels of equity ownership,
we plotted this relationship in Figure 2, similar to
Figure 1 (i.e. the x-axis representing low and high
levels of institutional distance and the y-axis rep-
resenting the levels of equity ownership by Chi-
nese MNEs; the solid line representing EMNEs
with the knowledge-seeking motive; and the dot-
ted line representing Chinese MNEs without the
knowledge-seeking motive). The solid line has a
positive slope while the dotted line has a nega-
tive slope when the institutional distance increases,
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Figure 2. Interaction of knowledge-seeking and institutional distance
indicating that Chinese MNEs with a knowledge-
seeking motive tend to adopt high levels of eq-
uity ownershipwith an increase in institutional dis-
tance. Hence, H2 is also supported.
Robustness checks
We performed several additional analyses for the
robustness. First, we adopted an alternative mea-
sure of the dependent variable by constructing a
new variable: WOS, which takes the value of 1 if a
Chinese MNE has 100% foreign subsidiary equity
ownership and 0 if the percentage of foreign sub-
sidiary equity is less than 100%. We then used this
dichotomous variable as the dependent variable
and re-ran the analyses. The results are reported in
Table 3. As shown in Model 5, the coefficient for
the interaction term, MS * institutional distance,
was negative and significant (b = −0.070, p =
0.000), with confidence interval [−0.099, −0.040].
Also, the coefficient for the interaction term, KS
* institutional distance, was positive and signifi-
cant (b = 0.069, p = 0.005), with confidence inter-
val [0.021, 0.118]. These results are consistent with
those using the continuous variable of levels of eq-
uity ownership.
Second, we constructed another alternative
measure of the dependent variable, majority-
owned, which takes the value of 1 if a Chinese
MNE has more than 50% foreign subsidiary eq-
uity ownership and 0 if the percentage is below
50%.We then used this alternative dependent vari-
able to re-run the analyses and report the results in
Table 4. Again, the results are consistent with those
reported in Table 2.
Third, we split the analyses into two parts:
EMNEs expanding to more-developed markets
vs. EMNEs’ expanding to less-developed markets.
Following prior studies (e.g. Kim et al., 2020), we
compared each host country’s real gross domestic
product per capita (GDPP), which was extracted
from the Penn World Table (PWT), with the cor-
responding value for China. Based on this com-
parison, we divided host countries into two groups
– developed and emerging countries. We then re-
ran the analyses for the two parts separately. We
found that the split results provide further support
for our hypotheses (see Table 5).
Fourth, prior studies have identified innovation
distance as a key factor influencingMNEs’ knowl-
edge transfer across borders, which is largely due
to institutional configurations that foster the de-
velopment of technology and innovation (Nelson
and Rosenberg, 1993). We thus replaced institu-
tional distance by adopting an alternativemeasure,
national innovation distance, which is relevant for
this study. We followed prior studies (Furman,
Porter and Stern, 2002; Nelson and Rosenberg,
1993) to measure national innovation distance by
extracting the number of patents and scientific
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Table 3. Results of robustness analyses: WOS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Firm age 0.992 1.024 1.098 1.094 1.106
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Firm size −1.142 −1.046 −1.030 −1.039 −1.035
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
State ownership percent 0.255 0.190 0.211 0.211 0.217
(0.000) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Past performance 0.484 0.421 0.402 0.398 0.406
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R&D intensity 0.187 0.250 0.141 0.211 0.160
(0.507) (0.380) (0.622) (0.462) (0.575)
Subsidiary age −1.020 −1.022 −1.087 −1.083 −1.099
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Subsidiary size 0.046 0.066 0.062 0.064 0.062
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Demographic distance 0.122 0.306 0.257 0.340 0.309
(0.083) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Culture distance −0.241 −0.271 −0.194 −0.229 −0.187
(0.001) (0.001) (0.015) (0.004) (0.019)
Geographic distance 0.330 0.166 0.173 0.125 0.127
(0.000) (0.033) (0.029) (0.121) (0.117)
Economic distance 0.226 0.190 0.146 0.152 0.131
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
OECD −0.029 0.019 −0.021 0.003 −0.013
(0.700) (0.797) (0.782) (0.972) (0.864)
Financial crisis −0.371 −0.310 −0.356 −0.328 −0.356
(0.001) (0.008) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003)
Correction for self-selection (λ) −2.836 1.739 1.734 1.439 1.612
(0.001) (0.114) (0.115) (0.195) (0.146)
Institutional distance −0.025 −0.042 −0.014 −0.062 −0.040
(0.001) (0.000) (0.198) (0.000) (0.005)
MS 0.343 0.292 0.287 0.272
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
KS 0.628 0.716 0.638 0.702
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
MS * Institutional distance −0.061 −0.070
(0.000) (0.000)
KS * Institutional distance 0.045 0.069
(0.067) (0.005)
Constant 2.273 1.640 1.764 1.799 1.805
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Industry dummy Included Included Included Included Included
Year dummy Included Included Included Included Included
Log-likelihood −5,159.244 −5,028.809 −4,939.280 −4,946.170 −4,935.368
AIC 10,380.488 10,123.617 9,946.561 9,960.340 9,940.737
Prob. > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N = 9,305. P-values are in parentheses.
articles per capita, from the United States Patent
and Trademark Office (USPTO), World Develop-
ment Indicators (WDI) and Independent Schools
Inspectorate (ISI) Governance, separately. We
used national institutional distance to re-run the
analyses. The results are reported in Table 6. As
shown in Model 4, the coefficient of the interac-
tion term, MS * innovation distance, is negative
and significant (b = −2.295, p = 0.000), with
confidence interval [−3.388, −1.201], while the
coefficient of the interaction term, KS * institu-
tional distance, is positive and significant (b =
4.411, p = 0.001), with confidence interval [1.822,
7.000]. These results are highly consistent with
those reported in Table 3, providing additional
support for the hypotheses.
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Table 4. Results of robustness analyses: majority-owned
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Firm age 2.023 1.956 1.786 2.068 2.066
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Firm size −2.219 −2.200 −2.455 −2.615 −2.617
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
State ownership percent 0.506 0.512 0.489 0.497 0.495
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Past performance −0.310 −0.362 −0.278 −0.283 −0.273
(0.088) (0.057) (0.172) (0.189) (0.207)
R&D intensity −0.425 0.004 −0.409 −0.498 −0.510
(0.491) (0.995) (0.575) (0.517) (0.505)
Subsidiary age −1.318 −1.176 −0.958 −0.931 −0.928
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Subsidiary size 0.084 0.144 0.153 0.171 0.169
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Demographic distance 1.120 1.385 1.960 2.454 2.440
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Culture distance 0.425 0.310 0.208 −0.051 −0.039
(0.005) (0.054) (0.236) (0.785) (0.837)
Geographic distance −0.200 −0.552 −1.037 −1.571 −1.576
(0.203) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Economic distance −0.324 −0.334 −0.480 −0.527 −0.541
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
OECD −0.212 −0.123 −0.150 0.024 0.022
(0.119) (0.390) (0.317) (0.873) (0.883)
Financial crisis 0.028 0.015 −0.092 0.057 0.053
(0.904) (0.951) (0.721) (0.833) (0.846)
Correction for self-selection (λ) −7.661 1.365 0.017 −3.486 −3.216
(0.000) (0.532) (0.993) (0.107) (0.138)
Institutional distance −0.207 −0.244 −0.180 −0.366 −0.351
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
MS 0.594 0.438 0.090 0.132
(0.000) (0.000) (0.519) (0.354)
KS 1.390 1.273 1.396 1.423
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
MS * Institutional distance −0.083 −0.083
(0.034) (0.136)
KS * Institutional distance 0.217 0.292
(0.008) (0.003)
Constant 5.569 4.231 4.204 4.558 4.525
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Industry dummy Included Included Included Included Included
Year dummy Included Included Included Included Included
Log-likelihood −1,746.242 −1,614.811 −1,459.639 −1,326.829 −1,325.704
AIC 3,550.483 3,291.623 2,983.279 2,717.658 2,717.408
Prob. > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N = 9,305. P-values are in parentheses.
Fifth, one potential concern could be whether
some sample firms did not declare their motives
regarding internationalization, and if (or how)
these firms could affect the robustness of the
findings. To address this concern, we examined the
detailed descriptions of the sample firms’ annual
reports. This step allowed us to further identify
such firms’ motives in a definitive way. In less than
seven firm cases in which we could not identify
motives, we took two steps to ensure that these
firms would not affect our results. We included
the firms in the analyses, classified them as neither
belonging to market-seeking nor knowledge-
seeking motives, and ran the analyses. We also
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Table 5. Results of robustness analyses: separating markets
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Less developed countries Developed countries
Firm age 15.970 16.041 7.378 6.999
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Firm size −8.847 −8.905 −8.532 −8.154
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
State ownership percent −1.688 −1.605 2.014 1.876
(0.115) (0.133) (0.001) (0.002)
Past performance −2.705 −3.209 0.505 −0.195
(0.069) (0.031) (0.584) (0.831)
R&D intensity 5.500 4.736 −0.500 −1.303
(0.231) (0.301) (0.787) (0.476)
Subsidiary age −11.109 −10.878 −5.231 −5.030
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Subsidiary size 0.136 0.133 0.382 0.449
(0.292) (0.307) (0.000) (0.000)
Demographic distance 5.366 5.076 3.203 3.537
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.001)
Culture distance 3.247 3.646 0.257 1.028
(0.008) (0.004) (0.720) (0.152)
Geographic distance −5.368 −5.594 5.049 5.120
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Economic distance 0.765 0.678 −2.503 −2.949
(0.194) (0.251) (0.000) (0.000)
OECD 3.850 3.796 −9.197 −9.777
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
Financial crisis 18.087 17.139 4.223 3.974
(0.000) (0.000) (0.061) (0.074)
Institutional distance −0.315 −0.292 −0.248 −0.550
(0.007) (0.060) (0.001) (0.103)
MS 6.688 7.523 −1.747 −1.696
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
KS 7.027 6.740 2.548 2.222
(0.000) (0.000) (0.037) (0.066)
MS * Institutional distance −0.447 −0.422
(0.036) (0.001)
KS * Institutional distance 0.637 0.011
(0.158) (0.980)
Constant 80.769 81.137 96.054 96.390
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Industry dummy Included Included Included Included
Year dummy Included Included Included Included
Log-likelihood −1.49e04 −1.47e04 −2.54e04 −2.52e04
AIC 29,762.568 29,489.886 50,950.681 50,376.973
Prob. > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
P-values are in parentheses.
excluded such cases from the analyses and re-ran
the analyses. The results excluding these few cases
are highly consistent with the results including
them.
In addition, given the use of the variety of in-
stitutional distance indices to check if the results
still hold using an alternative measure of insti-
tutional distance, we made great efforts to col-
lect additional variables from the Worldwide Gov-
ernance Indicators (WGIs) about the governance
score from 1996–2019. The WGIs’ governance
score is a composite variable consisting of six di-
mensions (i.e. voice and accountability, regulatory
quality, political stability and absence of violence,
rule of law, government effectiveness and control
of corruption). A higher score of this composite
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Table 6. Results of robustness analyses: innovation distance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Firm age 11.104 10.680 10.739 10.703
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Firm size −9.839 −9.855 −10.293 −10.162
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
State ownership percent 0.529 0.580 0.832 0.771
(0.333) (0.284) (0.125) (0.154)
Past performance −0.152 0.219 0.151 0.247
(0.852) (0.787) (0.853) (0.761)
R&D intensity 1.181 1.252 0.709 1.027
(0.523) (0.493) (0.698) (0.574)
Subsidiary age −7.237 −7.171 −7.078 −7.140
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Subsidiary size 0.250 0.253 0.273 0.269
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Demographic distance 8.901 8.113 10.014 9.281
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Culture distance −1.569 −1.664 −2.298 −2.094
(0.010) (0.006) (0.000) (0.001)
Geographic distance 5.650 6.070 6.488 6.419
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Economic distance 1.004 1.048 0.830 0.906
(0.001) (0.000) (0.004) (0.002)
OECD −2.458 −3.294 −4.075 −3.857
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Financial crisis −0.000 −1.543 −1.357 −1.477
(0.100) (0.076) (0.121) (0.091)
Correction for self-selection (λ) 25.665 20.693 16.284 16.965
(0.003) (0.017) (0.066) (0.055)
Innovation distance −4.387 −1.110 −7.793 −5.181
(0.000) (0.105) (0.000) (0.000)
MS 4.111 2.795 3.354 3.123
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
KS 6.931 6.819 8.358 7.904
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
MS * Innovation distance −3.784 −2.295
(0.000) (0.000)
KS * Innovation distance 5.904 4.411
(0.000) (0.001)
Constant 92.998 93.270 92.494 92.772
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Industry dummy Included Included Included Included
Year dummy Included Included Included Included
Log-likelihood −4.06e04 −4.01e04 −3.98e04 −3.98e04
AIC 81,212.642 80,335.846 79,688.793 79,673.818
Prob. > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N = 9,305. P-values are in parentheses.
variable represents a higher level of governance
and country or market institution market (Kauf-
mann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2010). We then used
this variable to construct an alternative measure of
institutional distance by subtracting the value of
each of the six dimensions of a host country from
that of China before taking the averaged value of
the summation of their absolute values, which is
specified as
Institutional distancei = 16 (|VAi − VAChina|
+ |RQi − RQChina| + |PSAVi − PSAVChina|
+ |RLi − RLChina| + |GEi − GEChina|
+ |CCi − CCChina|)
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where Institutional distancei represents the insti-
tutional distance between country i and China;
|VAi − VAChina| represents the absolute value of
difference between country i and China in terms
of voice and accountability; |RQi − RQChina| rep-
resents the absolute value of difference between
country i and China in terms of regulatory qual-
ity; |PSAVi − PSAVChina| represents the absolute
value of difference between country i and China;
|RLi − RLChina| represents the absolute value of
difference for rule of law score between country i
and China in terms of political stability and ab-
sence of violence; |GEi − GEChina| represents the
absolute value of difference between country i and
China in terms of government effectiveness; and
|CCi − CCChina| represents the absolute value of
difference between country i and China in terms
of control of corruption. We then substituted the
institutional stance with this variable, re-ran all the
analyses and report the results in Appendix B. As
clearly shown (see Model 5), the coefficient of the
interaction term, MS * institutional distance, was
negative and significant (b = −0.744, p = 0.000),
with confidence interval [−0.984, −0.504]. Also,
the coefficient of the interaction term, KS * insti-
tutional distance, was positive and significant (b =
0.574, p = 0.008), with confidence interval [0.150,
0.998]. These results are highly consistent with the
results reported in Table 2, indicating the robust-
ness of the analyses.
Discussion and conclusions
There has been increasing interest in examining
institutional distance and subsidiary ownership
choice (cf. Ahammad et al., 2017; Dikova, Arslan
and Larimo, 2017; Powell and Lim, 2017; Rienda
et al., 2019). Although studies have shown the sig-
nificance of national distance in MNE interna-
tionalization strategies (Contractor et al., 2014;
Dikova, Panibratov and Veselova, 2019; Eden and
Miller, 2004; Gaur and Lu, 2007; Moalla and
Mayrhofer, 2020;Xu, Pan andBeamish, 2004), less
attention has been paid to FDI motives, which are
an important predictor of a firm’s international
performance (Dunning andLundan, 2008; Lu, Liu
andWang, 2011). In this study, we examine the po-
tential moderating role of FDI motives in the re-
lationship between institutional distance and sub-
sidiary ownership control, which has not been well
examined in prior studies (e.g. Dikova, Panibra-
tov and Veselova, 2019; James, Sawant and Ben-
dickson, 2020; Moalla and Mayrhofer, 2020). We
theoretically argued and empirically showed that
different FDI motivations can amplify or buffer
the influence of institutional distance on sub-
sidiary ownership control, especially in the con-
text of EMNEs. Specifically, a knowledge-seeking
FDI motive negatively moderates the relationship
between institutional distance and levels of sub-
sidiary ownership, while a market-seeking FDI
motive has an opposite moderating effect – that is,
it positively moderates the relationship between in-
stitutional distance and levels of subsidiary own-
ership. These findings provide important insights
into the current literature, which has examined
institutional distance and entry mode choice (cf.
Dikova, Arslan and Larimo, 2017; Dikova, Pani-
bratov andVeselova, 2019;Moalla andMayrhofer,
2020; Rienda et al., 2019).
Theoretical contributions and implications
First, this study contributes to the literature on the
relationship between cross-national distance and
subsidiary ownership. We identified FDI motiva-
tions as a boundary condition for the impact that
cross-national distance has on subsidiary owner-
ship control, which has been neglected in previ-
ous studies (Ahammad et al., 2017; Berry, Guillén
andZhou, 2010;Dikova, Panibratov andVeselova,
2019; Powell and Lim, 2017; Xu and Shenkar,
2002; Zhao, Luo and Suh, 2004). Our findings
show that different FDI motivations play differ-
ent roles. Knowledge-seeking FDI positively af-
fects the relationship between institutional dis-
tance and degree of subsidiary ownership, while
market-seeking FDI negatively affects the relation-
ship between institutional distance and degree of
subsidiary ownership. These findings enrich theo-
retical and managerial insights on EMNE inter-
nationalization strategy and subsidiary ownership
control by pinpointing critical boundary condi-
tions.
Second, this study extends prior studies on
cross-national distance and subsidiary ownership
controls (Gaur and Lu, 2007; Xu and Shenkar,
2002) from a context of DMNEs to EMNEs
with distinct FDI motives. Although a large body
of scholarship has provided plenty of evidence
on the role of national distance in cross-border
international strategies and performance (Berry,
Guillén and Zhou, 2010; Jackson and Deeg, 2008;
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Pajunen, 2008), relatively insufficient effort has
been devoted to distinct FDI motives of EMNEs,
which may shed important insight into the role of
distance in ownership choices. The findings of this
study suggest that as a host country’s institutional
distance increases, EMNEs with a knowledge-
seeking FDI motive opt for greater equity own-
ership over local subsidiaries, which is useful for
knowledge transfer back to home and foreign op-
erations in order to develop capabilities (He, Khan
and Shenkar, 2018). In contrast, as the host coun-
try’s institutional distance increases, EMNEs with
a market-seeking FDI motive opt for lower eq-
uity ownership over local subsidiaries. Based on
these findings, we caution against generalizing on
the relationship between national distance and
subsidiary ownership control to EMNEs, because
their FDI motivation could make them unique
with regard to a large institutional distance. As
a result, ENMEs could adopt ownership equity
control that is different from what has been pre-
dicted based on DMNEs with regard to selecting
the proper subsidiary ownership (e.g. Ahammad
et al., 2017; Moalla and Mayrhofer, 2020).
Third, this study further contributes to the lit-
erature related to EMNE firm-specific advantages
(FSAs). Over the decades, international business
scholars have debated whether EMNEs possess
certain FSAs that facilitate their international ac-
tivities (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012; He et al., 2019;
Ramamurti, 2012). This study addresses this de-
bate by examining EMNCs’ FDI motives, insti-
tutional distance and ownership decisions. We ac-
knowledge that EMNEs face different constraints
and legitimacy issues from DMNCs and are thus
likely to pursue different FDI goals and strate-
gies. As many EMNEs lack sufficient manage-
rial capabilities for global operations, they tend
to rely on a light-touch approach to integrating
foreign operations with their home-country oper-
ations (cf. Liu and Woywode, 2013), thus main-
taining relatively weaker ownership over local op-
erations (Cuervo-Cazurra, Newburry and Park,
2016). These firms also give greater autonomy to
their foreign acquired firms, which supports learn-
ing and capabilities development efforts (e.g. He,
Khan and Shenkar, 2018). However, such firms
seem to reverse this approach when it comes to ac-
cessing or searching for advanced technologies or
innovation capabilities. Our findings suggest that
EMNEs’ ownership strategies are complex and
rely on the specific nature of a firm’s challenges
and goals. While this study provides new insights
on EMNE subsidiary ownership and FSAs, re-
searchers should also explore other potential con-
tingencies; for example, the nature of EMNEs’ ca-
pabilities and other firm-level strategic issues, such
as the orientation and scope of firm growth, to un-
lock this complex issue.
Fourth, this study contributes to the interna-
tionalization literature (Johanson and Vahlne,
1977; Vahlne and Johanson, 2017). The positive
moderating effect of a knowledge-seeking FDI
motive on the relationship between institutional
distance and ownership control suggests that
knowledge-seeking EMNEs commit more re-
sources when institutional distance is high. The
internationalization theory has suggested that dur-
ing the internationalization process,MNEs tend to
make fewer commitments to foreign markets with
a large institutional distance, given the unfamil-
iarity arising from operating in foreign markets.
These findings add to this literature by suggesting
that while such a gradual internationalization pro-
cess still holds for EMNEs with market-seeking
motives, EMNEs with knowledge-seeking mo-
tives tend to embrace more commitments to
foreign markets with large institutional distance.
This study sheds light on the internationaliza-
tion theory by pinpointing FDI motives as a
key component for theoretical development and
refinements. These findings are especially useful as
scholars strive to expand the internationalization
process to EMNEs with distinct FDI motives.
Practical implications
Our results should alert practicing managers to
the idea that successful global expansion hinges on
the fit between specific FDI motives, institutional
distance and the appropriate level of subsidiary
equity ownership. When establishing a subsidiary
in a foreign market with a large institutional
distance, EMNEs face challenges of effective
operations, communications, integrations and
coordination across borders – all of which result
in high transaction costs. An appropriate degree
of ownership helps EMNEs achieve their intended
goals, minimize transaction costs and ensure the
long-term growth of foreign operations. Suc-
cessful internationalization begins with a careful
assessment of the nature and extent of the cross-
national distance, the specific motivations for
foreign investments and the appropriate selection
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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of subsidiary equity ownership. For example, the
fact that a negative effect of institutional distance
appears to be stronger in market-seeking FDIs
suggests that if an EMNE’s primary goal is inter-
national market growth, it must empower and lo-
calize foreign operations as much as possible with
a lower level of subsidiary ownership. However,
if an EMNE pursues a knowledge-seeking goal
in a country with large institutional distance, it
needs to maximize control over foreign operations
to manage efficient knowledge acquisition and
transfer. In sum, it is critical and important that
managers are aware of these motivation-specific
implications of subsidiary equity ownership and
ensure that a host country’s institutional distance
from the home country is taken into account.
Limitations and future directions
This study paves the way for future studies in
several directions. First, it represents one of the
first studies to explore the role of EMNEs’ FDI
motives in the role of distance in ownership
choice. In doing so, this study considers two
important types of FDI motivation (i.e. market-
seeking and knowledge-seeking). However, it
should be recognized that EMNEs have other
FDI motivations than the two we examine (e.g.
efficiency-seeking, resource-seeking and escape
motives). Although the central interest of this
study is in showing the opposite roles of market-
seeking vs. knowledge-seeking FDI motives in
the effect of institutional distance on the levels of
subsidiary ownership, it would be a worthwhile
and potentially promising avenue for future stud-
ies to look more broadly at other types of FDI
motives and delve deeper into their interactions.
Second, in this study we utilized large-scale panel
data on EMNEs’ internationalization activities –
including their FDI motives, institutional distance
and subsidiary ownership – to test our hypothe-
ses, and performed a range of robustness checks
with rigorous and consistent results. However, it
remains important to be cautious in generalizing
the findings to other emerging market contexts.
Although China represents the biggest emerging
market, such markets are highly idiosyncratic.
The field would benefit greatly if future studies
extend, replicate and compare issues examined
in this study across a broader set of emerging
markets. Cross-emerging market studies could
also reveal the role of country- or firm-specific
strategic orientations in understanding EMNE
subsidiary ownerships. Future studies could also
examine the timing of entry and ownership choice
adopted by firms from different emerging markets.
Lastly, future studies could integrate both formal
and informal institutional distance and examine
their role in EMNE subsidiary ownership choices,
as well as their post-entry performance.
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